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Abstract 
One of the fundamental questions in corporate finance is what determines firms’ 
financing decisions. Capital structure varies greatly among firms in the real world and, the 
determinants of the capital structure still largely remained unexplained. In the traditional 
financial theories, several approaches have been developed to explain how firms make their 
financing decisions. Myers and Majluf (1984) introduced the asymmetric information approach 
to explain corporate financing choices when managers are assumed to have inside information 
that outside investors do not have. The pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Myers, 
1984) describes that managers prefer internal over external financing and debt over equity if 
external financing is needed. This occurs because managers perceive issuing equity to be overly 
costly while perceiving issuing debt to be less costly and using internal funds to be costless. The 
trade off theory states that the target debt ratio of the firm is determined by balancing debt tax 
shields against financial distress costs (Myers, 2001). It predicts that large firms with tangible 
assets tend to have higher leverage. Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) examined the financing 
behaviors of the 157 U.S. firms and found that debt issues were used to finance deficit of these 
firms supporting the pecking order theory. Although the pecking order theory largely contributes 
to explain how firms make financing choices empirical evidence has been to some extent 
contradictory. For instance, previous studies found evidence that contradicts the pecking order 
theory (Fama & French. 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2003, Goyal, 2007). Thus, more robust evidence 
is required to explain why firms make different financing choices.  
It is only recently that psychological and behavioral features have been considered as an 
important factor in the corporate decision making processes. Roll (1986) contends in his hubris 
theory that managerial overconfidence could affect corporate decisions. Several other researchers 
attempted to explain why optimal debt levels are not achieved in some firms by associating 
managerial overconfidence with financing decisions (Heaton, 2002; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 
Malmendier et al., 2008). Specifically, several studies emphasized that overconfidence could 
influence investment decision making processes. Hackbarth (2006) maintained that 
overconfident CFOs tended to choose more aggressive debt policies because they underestimated 
the volatility of their firms’ cash flows. Ben-David et al. (2007) associated overconfidence with 
corporate policies and found that 1) overconfidence was positively related to debt leverage 2) the 
use of long-term debt was higher for firms with overconfident CFOs. It is posited that 
overconfident CEOs prefer debt over equity because they believe issuing new equity will 
destruct the value of existing shareholders (Malmendier et al., 2007; Malmendier & Tate, 2005; 
Heaton, 2002). Malmendier and Tate (2008) analyzed the effect of overconfidence on acquisition 
decisions and found that overconfident CEOs perceived issuing equity to be costly even when 
the valuations of their firms by investors were correct. In sum, it has been argued that 
overconfident CEOs will display the preferences for debt over equity financing.  
In this paper, therefore, we contend that managerial overconfidence could help us better 
understand one of the fundamental questions in corporate finance; why firms choose different 
capital structures. Further, we extend the previous studies on the financing decisions by 
characterizing companies based on the pattern of capital structure in relation to manager 
overconfidence. By characterizing the companies we expect to discover whether there is any 
consistent pattern in capital structure and financial performance of hospitality firms with regard 
to manager overconfidence. Therefore, the findings of this paper will fill a critical gap in the 
hospitality literature on the capital structure and provide meaningful explanations for the use of 
different financing means when considering behavioral aspects of management.  
The data of this study will include publicly traded U.S. lodging and restaurant companies 
between 1999 and 2009. In order to determine the relationship between overconfidence and 
financing decisions a multiple regression will be conducted using debt-to-equity ratio as a 
dependent variable. Our main independent variable is overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate 
(2005) developed three overconfidence measures based on the personal portfolio decisions of 
CEOs. We will use expense ratio as a proxy for agency cost in order to distinguish the effect of 
overconfidence from traditional agency theory. Expense ratio is defined as operating expense 
scaled by annual sales. Additionally, independent variables as proxied by the determinants of 
capital structure such as size, profitability, and tangibility will be adopted from previous studies 
(Titman & Wessels, 1988; Fama & French, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2004). The following cross-
sectional time-series model will be used to analyze the relationships among variables.  
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